In the article we published on Thursday, at the end of the summit's second day, we wrote that nothing had been signed or published - and that neither side intended to issue a joint statement.
On day three both published. Separately, as had been briefed in advance.
I read both documents in full. They are not describing the same summit.
Errors or inaccuracies are possible. Spotted something that looks wrong? Write to me and I will correct it.
The two documents:
- The White House, 25 September - a fact sheet on the state visit.
- China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 September - "China and the United States Reach Eight Deliverables and Understandings".
There is no third, joint document. What exists is two versions, a day apart.
The First Gap, and the Sharpest: What to Call It
The American document states:
"The two leaders agreed to use the term 'super intelligence' rather than 'artificial intelligence' to describe the applicable emerging technologies."
It goes on to establish the "U.S.-China Super Intelligence (SI) Dialogue", and "a bilateral communication channel for SI incidents".
The Chinese document, in its seventh item:
"The two sides agree on the establishment of the China-U.S. AI Dialogue to exchange views on risks and benefits related to AI. The next exchange will occur in November 2026. China and the U.S. also agree to establish a bilateral communication channel for AI incidents."
The same mechanism exactly, under two different names. The Chinese document does not use the term "super intelligence" even once.
And then China was asked about it directly - and published a dedicated answer on 26 September:
Q: "In the U.S. readout on the outcomes of the just concluded state visit, we noted the use of 'super intelligence' rather than 'artificial intelligence.' How does China see this?"
A: "The two presidents had in-depth discussion on AI during this visit. On what term to use for artificial intelligence, China attaches importance to the position of the U.S. side and respects their choice of the term. The advancement of artificial intelligence is an ongoing process. Parties can have more communication and in-depth exchange of views to seek consensus in light of how the process may evolve."
"Respects their choice of the term" is not agreement. It is a polite way of saying that is your word.
And why this matters beyond semantics: the American document presents agreement on how the problem is defined. If the two sides do not agree what to call the technology, they have also not agreed precisely what the new mechanism is meant to cover. A communication channel whose scope each side defines differently is a weaker channel than the headline suggests.
The Second Gap: Iran
The American text:
"They agreed that Iran can never have a nuclear weapon and that no country or institution can be allowed to impose tolls on international waterways."
The Chinese text:
"The two heads of state agree that Iran should honor its commitment to not developing nuclear weapons, and no country or institution can be allowed to impose tolls on international waterways."
The difference is not accidental. The American formulation is a prohibition - an outcome that will not come about. The Chinese formulation points to an existing commitment by Iran, leaning on the agreements regime rather than on a unilateral declaration.
And what is identical: the sentence on waterways appears word for word in both documents. In a summit where almost every formulation differs, this is the one item where both sides chose exactly the same words - which suggests it was drafted in advance and with care.
The Third Gap: What Exactly Is $30 Billion
In Thursday's article we wrote that estimates of a package of around $30 billion were attributed to a commentator and not to a document. The number is now in both documents - but not with the same meaning.
The American text:
"Under the Board of Trade, the two countries reached consensus on recommendations for more favorable tariff treatment for $30 billion of non-sensitive goods in each direction."
It specifies: for US exports - agricultural goods, fish and seafood, logs and wood products, cosmetics and medical devices. For US imports - consumer products such as small appliances, toys, holiday decorations and children's car seats.
The Chinese text:
"...including establishing and taking forward the Board of Trade and other mechanisms, reaching an arrangement for a US$30 billion reciprocal tariff reduction, and the extension of the outcomes of economic and trade consultations in Kuala Lumpur."
"Recommendations" and "an arrangement" are not the same thing, and neither are "more favourable tariff treatment" and "a tariff reduction". And what is clear in both versions: this is not a purchase agreement. Neither document commits anyone to buying $30 billion of anything - both are about tariff treatment for goods moving in both directions.
What Appears on Only One Side
Only in the American document:
- Coal: China will import at least 10 million metric tons of US coal in 2027 and again in 2028.
- Rare earths: the two countries "continue to work" on supply chain shortages in rare earths and other critical minerals, with the goal of returning shipment levels to appropriate levels.
- The President urged President Xi to increase production of refined petroleum products to stabilise global supply.
- Arms control: the President advocated trilateral negotiations between the US, Russia and China.
- The United States' forward military presence has preserved a free and open Indo-Pacific.
- Fentanyl: in August 2026 China arrested 21 Chinese citizens, acting on information from US law enforcement; the US encouraged maximum sentences.
Only in the Chinese document:
- The two militaries agree to conclude a memorandum of understanding on crisis communication and prevention as soon as possible.
- Continued cooperation to search for the remains of missing US servicemembers in China.
- The visit ran, in the Chinese wording, from 23 to 25 September local time.
The military memorandum is the most interesting item on that list - and it appears on one side only. A military-to-military channel for preventing escalation is exactly the sort of thing one would expect in both documents.
And What Is Missing From Both: Taiwan
Taiwan appears in neither document. Not in the American fact sheet, and not in the list of eight deliverables.
In Thursday's article we noted that Taiwan was not mentioned publicly by either leader, and that a spokesman for China's defence ministry called it "the most important issue in China-US relations". The most important issue, per the Chinese side itself, did not make it into either side's summary document.
And What Is Shared
Beyond the waterways sentence, both documents include: building "a constructive relationship of strategic stability on the basis of respect, fairness, and reciprocity" - in near-identical wording; mutual support in hosting the G20 and APEC, with both leaders intending to attend the other's summit; a recollection that the two countries were allies in the Second World War; and two giant pandas leased to Zoo Atlanta.
And the Market Angle
On Friday, the first trading day after the American fact sheet was published, the Brent oil fund fell 3.54% - while the S&P 500 rose 0.54% and the Nasdaq 100 rose 0.46%.
The two items in the American document that touch oil directly are the call to increase refined production, and the shared sentence on tolls in international waterways - which, in the context of recent weeks, is a statement about the Strait of Hormuz.
This needs saying carefully: I am describing a sequence, not proving causation. Oil prices move for many reasons on any given day, and the document contains no quantitative production commitment.
הזווית שלי
דעה אישית של אילן אברמוב - לא ייעוץ ולא המלצה
What I take from these two documents is that the absence of a joint statement was not a technical matter - it was necessary.
On Thursday we wrote that two countries that agree publish a document, and two that want to look as though they are getting along publish pictures. Now there are documents, and the point can be sharpened: when each side publishes alone, each side can write the summit it wants to present at home. A joint statement would have forced them to pick one wording - and as we can see, there was no one wording.
And the cleanest example is the term itself. I struggle to think of a clearer marker of the limits of agreement than two governments establishing a joint mechanism and calling it by two different names. And the Chinese spokesperson's answer is a small masterpiece: it does not deny, does not confirm, and hands the choice back to the other side - "respects their choice of the term". Anyone reading that as agreement is reading it wrong.
And what I think deserves particular attention is the military memorandum, which appears only on the Chinese side. A military-to-military channel for preventing escalation is, in terms of global risk, probably the most consequential item on the whole list - and it did not make the American document.
For an investor, the practical line has not changed since Thursday: no tariff was removed, no market was opened, no export restriction was lifted. What was added is mechanisms, timetables and intentions - and two texts that show exactly how far those are agreed.
(It is important to stress: this is my personal opinion only, and nothing herein constitutes a recommendation to take any action.)
Ilan Abramov, the author, or anyone on his behalf may hold some of the securities or funds mentioned in this article.
