On 13 August 2026 the United States imposed tariffs on imports of drones and their components. This is a review of the proclamation itself.
Errors or inaccuracies are possible. Spotted something that looks wrong? Write to me and I will correct it.
What Was Imposed
On 13 August 2026 a presidential proclamation was signed, titled "Adjusting Imports of Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Unmanned Aircraft Systems Components into the United States", under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
| Tariff rate | On what | Effective |
|---|---|---|
| 100% | Drones with a maximum take-off weight above 25 kg | 3 September 2026 |
| 100% | Drones integrating thermal imagers | 3 September 2026 |
| 100% | Docking stations and certain critical components | 3 September 2026 |
| 25% | Drones with a maximum take-off weight of 25 kg or less | 3 September 2026 |
| 25% | Certain further components | 9 February 2027 |
And these tariffs are additive. In the words of the proclamation, they apply in addition to any other duty, tax, fee or charge already applying to the product. They also continue in effect until expressly reduced, modified or terminated - there is no expiry date.
Why 25 Kilograms, and Why Docking Stations
The proclamation explains its logic, and it is worth reading because it explains the structure of the tiers.
The higher rate was placed on heavy drones because, according to the proclamation, they can more easily be used for weapons-related purposes and are more likely to carry sophisticated surveillance technologies.
And docking stations received the same 100% for a different reason: they are used to control autonomous drone systems, and those are typically deployed around critical infrastructure in the United States.
This is a distinction worth holding on to: the tiers are not by price or by import volume, but by what the product enables. A small hobby drone pays 25%; the same drone with a thermal sensor pays 100%.
The determining element is not the drone - it is the capability.
The Heart of It: Moving Production, Not Collecting Money
Reading this proclamation only as a tariff misses most of it. It contains a mechanism designed explicitly to move production onto US soil, rather than merely to make imports more expensive.
The first: a deliberate 180-day delay. The tariff on Annex III components takes effect only on 9 February 2027, and the language of the proclamation is explicit - the delay is intended "to incentivize production onshoring". In other words, a six-month window in which components can still be imported cheaply, in order to build a domestic production line in the meantime.
And the second, more significant: the onshoring programme. The Secretary of Commerce is authorised and required to establish an incentive programme for investment in US production capacity:
A company whose onshoring plan is approved may import the covered products for its supply chain and the production equipment itself - without paying Section 232 duties at all.
The exempt volume is set according to the annual output the US facility is reasonably anticipated to produce once the project is complete, and the benefit runs for the period the facility is under construction.
The condition: a commitment to build, refurbish or expand a facility in the United States, and construction beginning before 20 January 2029.
And this is not a benefit without teeth. The Secretary may require reports, may require that they be audited including by external auditing firms, and may rescind the benefit from any company failing to meet its commitments. In cases of fraud or deliberate misleading of the government, rescission may be retroactive, and Customs and Border Protection will collect the difference.
And Who Is Already Inside
Clause 7 grants a further 180-day deferral to companies that are, as of 2 September 2026, on one of three lists: the Department of War's Blue UAS Cleared List, the Blue UAS Framework, or the FCC's Conditional Approval List.
That is to say, a manufacturer that has already passed US security vetting gets a further six months before the tariff touches it.
The Caps for Allied Countries
Not all imports are treated the same. The proclamation sets caps:
| Country | Tariff cap |
|---|---|
| Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, EU member states | 15% |
| United Kingdom | 10% |
But the cap is conditional. It applies only if the importer certifies that substantially all critical components and technology originate in the United States, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the European Union or the United Kingdom. The Secretary will establish the verification process and inform Customs.
And Israel does not appear in the proclamation. The word "Israel" does not appear in the text at all.
It is not on the list of countries receiving a tariff cap, and it is not among the "Trade Agreement Partners" listed in the drawback clause, which covers the United Kingdom, the European Union, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Japan, Korea, Mexico and Canada, and "any trading partner with which the United States concludes a trade and security agreement".
What this means in practice depends on the tariff classification of each individual product and on the origin of its components, and no blanket conclusion about any particular Israeli manufacturer can be drawn from it. What can be said is that the reduced-cap mechanism, as drafted, does not apply to it.
And the List Can Grow
Clause 5 authorises the Secretary of Commerce to add components to the tariff list on a rolling basis, if he determines that their imports have increased in a way that threatens national security or that undermines the effectiveness of the action.
And the proclamation adds that in deciding, he may solicit information and recommendations from domestic producers and industry associations. That is to say, the US manufacturer gets an open door to point at a component being imported around it.
What This Does for the US Manufacturer
That is the practical question, and the answer lies in the combination of the four mechanisms:
| The mechanism | The effect on a manufacturer producing in the US |
|---|---|
| A 25% to 100% tariff on imports | Makes the imported competitor more expensive |
| A 180-day delay on components | Leaves a window to build a line before inputs get dearer |
| A full exemption during construction | Reduces the cost of building the facility itself |
| Adding components on producer request | Allows import gaps to be closed later |
The proclamation states the objective itself: encouraging domestic production, reducing reliance on foreign sources and foreign supply chains, strengthening industrial resilience, and strengthening the ability of the defence industrial base to produce domestically the key systems that support military operations and readiness.
Who Sits on the Right Side of the Mechanism
Disclosure: the writer holds shares of Ondas (ONDS) as of the date of publication, and those holdings may change at any time without notice. Nothing here is a recommendation to take any action in the security. See the full disclosure and disclaimer at the foot of the page.
The proclamation names no company. What it does do is define four tests, and every company falls on one side or the other of them:
| The test | Who meets it |
|---|---|
| Manufactures in the United States | Its imported competitor becomes 25% to 100% dearer |
| On the Blue UAS or FCC list on 2 September | Receives a further 180 days |
| Building new US capacity | Imports components and production equipment duty-free while building |
| Produces in the categories hit with 100% | Above 25 kg, thermal imaging, docking stations |
Three US listed companies sit at the centre of these areas. The figures below are from their most recent filings, and they describe scale and mix - not an outcome expected from the proclamation.
AeroVironment
The largest of the three. In the fiscal year ended 30 April 2026 it reported revenue of $1.977 billion, up 141%, with bookings of $2.7 billion and a book-to-bill ratio of 1.4. Funded backlog stood at $1.2 billion.
The business splits into two segments: Autonomous Systems, which recorded $492.4 million in the fourth quarter, and Space, Cyber and Directed Energy, with $149.2 million. The growth leaned heavily on the acquisition of BlueHalo, which closed on 1 May 2025, and Empirical Systems Aerospace, which closed in March 2026 - the two contributed $282.3 million in the fourth quarter alone.
CEO Wahid Nawabi describes the company's focus as "rising global demand across lethal and non-lethal drones, counter-UAS, space and advanced technologies" - which is precisely the set of categories the proclamation taxes at the higher rate.
Kratos
In the second quarter of 2026 it reported revenue of $458.8 million, up 30.5% with 19.1% organic growth. The Unmanned Systems segment recorded $79.1 million, organic growth of 8.1%, meaning about a sixth of the company.
The book-to-bill ratio for the quarter was 1.1, and 1.3 over the trailing twelve months with bookings of $1.990 billion. The company raised its full-year revenue guidance to $1.750-1.810 billion.
Net income was just $4.4 million on that revenue, with adjusted EBITDA of $38.2 million - that is to say, a company of large scale and thin profitability, in which a change in the competitive environment is felt in the bottom line relatively quickly.
Ondas
The smallest of the three by revenue, and the most concentrated in the field. In the second quarter it reported revenue of $83.8 million and pro forma backlog of $757 million. We wrote about the report at length.
And in terms of the proclamation's mechanism, its profile is the closest to the onshoring programme's conditions: according to its reporting it has six US facilities totalling 230,000 square feet, which it describes as underutilised, it added 560 US employees, and it plans a further 50,000 square feet. Its counter-drone activity sits in the category the proclamation taxes at 100%.
And what has to be said in the same breath: the tariff cuts both ways.
A US manufacturer that imports components - sensors, motors, thermal cameras - will pay 25% on them from 9 February 2027, unless they originate in one of the capped countries or its onshoring plan has been approved. The proclamation makes the competitor dearer, but it also makes the supply chain dearer for anyone who has not yet moved it.
And a benefit conditional on administrative approval is not held until it is granted. The onshoring programme requires an application, approval by the Secretary of Commerce, and compliance with commitments under audit. At this stage the programme's procedures have not been published.
Which of these companies actually ends up on the benefiting side depends on the tariff classification of each product, on the origin of its components, and on administrative approvals not yet granted. Those are three unknowns at present.
הזווית שלי
דעה אישית של אילן אברמוב - לא ייעוץ ולא המלצה
What stands out most here is that this is not really a tariff measure. It is an industrial programme, and the tariff is its instrument.
An ordinary tariff is meant to make imports dearer and leave the money in the treasury. This proclamation is built the other way round: it grants a full duty exemption precisely to whoever builds a factory, including on the production equipment. A company moving production to the United States does not merely benefit from its competitor becoming more expensive - it receives its inputs duty-free while it builds. That is a subsidy, even if it is not called one.
And the tiering by capability rather than by price tells us about the intent. The distinction between a 25-kilogram drone and a drone with a thermal sensor is a security distinction, not an economic one. Anyone reading this as a trade measure will miss it - this is a measure drafted in the language of a defence industry.
And what I would follow from here is three dates rather than one: 3 September, when the tariff on drones takes effect; 2 September, the day on which the list of who receives the 180-day deferral is fixed; and 9 February 2027, when the tariff on components begins. Between the first and the last there are five months, and that is precisely the window the proclamation gives to anyone who intends to build.
And one open question with no answer yet: how the Secretary will exercise the rolling addition power. Authority to add components to the list on the basis of approaches from domestic producers is a very broad authority, and the manner of its exercise will determine how much of the industry is actually covered.
(An important note: this is my personal opinion only, and nothing here is a recommendation to take any action.)
